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Abstract
Current sensor networks for Early Warning Systems (EWS) have a
simple monolithic structure where data is acquired at the network edges
and then transmitted over a “dumb” infrastructure to the Early Warn-
ing Center (EWC) for analysis. This structure has proven inadequate
for cross-organisational EWS and inter-EWS communication. The re-
cently started Herold research project suggests a distributed architecture
for network security systems based on independent network agents. While
Herold is still in an early stage and much larger in scope, its central ideas
can already be applied to alleviate the problems of monolithic EWS ar-
chitectures.
1 The monolithic approach to sensor net-
works
The goal of an Early Warning System (EWS) is to collect all security
relevant information about a network, process it and present it to its users
in near realtime. Sensor networks are the main technique employed for
this goal: A large number of sensor systems are deployed throughout the
target network. Each in a place where network usage is somehow deemed
relevant and the set of all sensors together considered ”representative” for
the network as a whole, much like TV ratings for a country are deduced
from the TV habits of certain representative households.
Each sensor transmits the collected data to a central node, the Early
Warning Center (EWC), where the data is processed and analysed. The
transmission may either happen directly or through a concentrator node.
A concentrator node collects the data stream of many sensors into one
stream, possibly pre-processing or compressing it to reduce network load,
and then forwards it to the EWC. The resulting structure is a three-level
hierarchy where data collection is done at the edges and the data only
flows inwards to a central point of processing. Since the sensor network’s
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main purpose is to forward the data to a central point of analysis, each
component can be kept very simple and does not need to store any data.
Everything is forwarded immediately and pre-processing is only as needed
for practical purposes during transport. The types and interconnections
of these data transmitting nodes make up the data flow architecture of
the EWS. Since data flows across multiple interconnected nodes before
reaching the EWC, it is a distributed data flow architecture.
In the described scenario, a distributed architecture is employed purely
for technical reasons. It exists because the network data of interest is
scattered across the network. If there was a place in the network where
all relevant data could be observed at once, the distributed architecture
would not be needed.
This EWS structure of a “dumb” sensor network and an “intelligent”
center will be called the monolithic approach.
2 Deficiencies of the monolithic approach
2.1 Dealing with organisationally diverse struc-
tures
When trying to deploy a large sensor network in practice (i.e. beyond
the limits of a research testbed), one severe limitation of the monolithic
approach quickly becomes clear: It is not well suited to deal with an en-
vironment that requires administrative distribution and cooperation, i.e.
where the network nodes and collected data are under different adminis-
trative control. But for an EWS to be able to truly capture a represen-
tative image of the current situation on the Internet, data from different
kinds of networks (open Internet, darknet, honeypot network, DMZ) and
different kinds of network operators (small companies, large companies,
ISPs, housing providers, universities) has to be collected and processed.
The networks and network operators have
• different goals and motivations for network analysis,
• different privacy and data protection requirements,
• different data rates,
• different storage requirements for recording a history of network traf-
fic, and
• different requirements about who to grant data access to (and also
to revoke it again).
For an EWS to be successful in practice, its data flow architecture and
overall operational model have to at least satisfy each network operator’s
basic requirements in the above areas.
Additionally, since operating an EWS node requires contribution of
resources, there further is a question of motivating network operators to
participate in an EWS. Agreeing to operate an EWS node must result in
some kind of benefit for its operator.
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While contributing data to an EWS for the “greater good” of an overall
network view might motivate some of the network operators, practice
shows that this is usually not enough. In the monolithic architecture
described above, a network node (sensor or concentrator) is mainly a
black box that “sucks up” network traffic and transmits it to the remote
EWC without the network operator having much control or further access
to it. In a scenario, where no administrational borders are crossed, this
is not a problem since the network operator can be granted full access
to the EWC itself and access all its visualisations and analyses. But in
large-scale EWS, the network node operators can usually not be given an
attractive level of access.
While pseudonymisation or anonymisation of addresses might make it
possible to give operators a certain level of access, they require “dumbing
down” the data and so present a trade-off between suitability for analysis
and privacy requirements.
Another option would be to add multitenancy-capabilities to the EWC.
Each operator would only see the data from his or her nodes when ac-
cessing the EWC. But multitenancy would either require the EWC to
replicate all processing steps for each possible tenant or to process data
on-the-fly for each tennants access request. Both approaches would result
in a drastic increase in CPU-workload at the EWC and the first approach
would additionally increase storage requirements.
Even when access can be granted, the different views of network op-
erators on the data comes into play. Not surprisingly, network operators
are much more interested in what is happening in their own network than
what is happening on the Internet in general. They are interested in
sudden changes or even single events on their own network, regardless of
whether other node operators see them, too. They tend to see a sensor
network much more as a kind of distributed IDS, rather than an EWS.
EWS operators on the other hand want to detect event-types and trends
that span the whole observed network. While functions taking a node-
local view and accessing single events are usually available, they are not
the main focus and not automated to a useful level.
Summing up, for an EWS (or any cross-domain sensor network) to be
successful in practice, it must be able to not only satisfy network oper-
ators individual requirements for data collection, processing and storage
but also provide them with an attractive benefit in return for operating
the network node. One such benefit is the provision of a node-specific view
on the data that focusses on individual events and network characteris-
tics rather than overall features of the sensor network. The monolithic
architecture is not well-suited for this requirement.
2.2 EWS cooperation and automated analysis: Get-
ting data back-out again
Another requirement that sooner or later shows up both from a research
and from a daily-use perspective is the need to get data back out of the
EWS for (possibly automated) third-party analysis and to facilitate inter-
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EWS data-exchange.
As described above, in the monolithic approach data only flows from
the edges of the network to the center where it gets processed and stored.
Because of this hierarchical structure, the initial design of a sensor net-
work tends to omit flexible, network-accessible interfaces to export the
saved data (both raw and processed). Export interfaces get added as an
afterthought in conceptually non-clean ways and for specific, rather than
generic, needs, possibly introducing new data formats or access protocols.
Creating export interfaces either requires a lot of internal restructuring
and implementation work or leaves the interfaces unflexible and not very
useful, possibly requiring even more different interfaces when the next ex-
port requirement comes along.
Because of its importance for future EWS, the issue of inter-EWS co-
operation will be discussed in more detail. Maturing and growing out
of their testbeds, EWS systems are proposed on different organisational
levels. A large company or other network operator might consider run-
ning its own EWS and larger EWS are envisioned on national level or
even international levels (e.g. by the European Union). While it might
be possible to run a national and an EU-level EWS in parallel, this would
require (and waste) a lot of resources. A more attractive and efficient
option would be to create a federation of national EWS and have them
cooperate, forming a “virtual EWS” that stores little or no original data
but provides EWS information via access to the national EWS that it is
based on. For this kind of cooperative approach, a much more flexible in-
terface is needed in an EWS. Exporting a data feed in real-time is useful,
but requires the importer to again store and process the data to use it.
Also, once data is exported, an EWS operator loses direct control over it.
Access rights cannot easily be changed or revoked and data is more diffi-
cult to delete. While the creation and operation of such federated EWS
is a research topic in itself, it should be clear that again the monolithic
approach is not well-suited to deal with a structure like this.
A new model is required that honors and actively supports node or
EWS operators in the fulfilment of their diverse requirements for run-
ning an EWS or other sensor network. Such a model for truly distibuted
network security will be suggested by the Herold research project and
described in the next section.
3 The distributed Herold approach, ap-
plied to Early Warning Systems
3.1 The Herold project
Herold is a research project on distributed network security. It is a col-
laboration between PRESENSE Technologies GmbH, the Group “The-
oretical Foundations of Computer Science” of the University of Ham-
burg, and n@work Internet Informationssysteme GmbH. It was started
in mid-2009 as a 2-year project, partially funded by the German Fed-
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eral Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) as part of the “KMU-
Innovationsoffensive Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie”.
The long term goal that is explored is the interpretation of network
monitoring and policy enforcement as a collective group effort by cooper-
ating but independent “network agents”. Each agent maintains its own
knowledge base about the network structure, the currently operated net-
work policy, and the high-level security goals and best-practices. Also,
each agent is equipped with technical means, so called “network security
components”, to enforce a network policy (e.g. by Firewalls) as well as
monitor it (e.g. by IDS or Netflow probes). Agents use these security
components to pursue individual security goals as well as goals that they
have agreed upon with other agents. Because each agent has access to
different security components, an agent may ask (or force) another agent
to enforce part of its policy, thereby fulfilling security goals or monitor
a specific part of the network and provide resulting event information.
This results in a continuous exchange of information and services between
agents.
The Herold project will first create detailed models consisting of agents’
roles, actions, interactions and workflows and model these formally using
the PAOSE (Petri net-based Agent-Oriented Software Engineering) tech-
niques developed at the University of Hamburg. After that, central ques-
tions will be the modelling of global network-, policy- and event-spaces,
their agent- and security-component-local meaning and the formal and
practical relationships between those levels. In the second half of the
project, a first implementation of the new approach will be created in the
form of a network policy enforcement framework. This framework will
allow the efficient and secure enforcement of a global network policy in a
local context and with the security components available to a given agent.
Even though, the Herold project is still in its early stages, and the
model is not yet formalised, the central ideas can already be applied to
provide a new architecture for EWS and tackle some of the problems
described above. At the same time, this will hopefully shed some more
concrete light on the rather abstract concepts of the Herold approach.
3.2 Early Warning Systems from a network agent
point of view
In the distributed architecture suggested by Herold, each EWS is con-
sidered an independent network agent. Each network node in a given
EWS can either be modelled as a security component or a network agent
itself. Simple sensors might adequately be modelled as security compo-
nents, while concentrator nodes that collect data from all sensors in a
given administrative domain would be considered network agents. A rule
of thumb would be that every time the EWS structure crosses an organ-
isational boundary, the connection should be modelled as a connection
between agents, not between agent and security component.
Each network agent then functions according to an operational model
similar to the one that was used for the central EWC node at the mono-
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lithic approach.
Each agent individually
• maintains a structural and attribute description of the network it is
“interested in” or responsible for,
• maintains a description of the network parts that it can directly (via
security components) or indirectly (via subordinate or cooperating
agents) control or monitor,
• maintains a network policy in the form of algorithms that evaluate
a network status according to early warning principles (or similar
network monitoring principles),
• analyses and evaluates incoming network events according to the
policy and provides results and visualisations in near realtime,
• records network events as a history for further reference and analysis,
and
• offers an “agent interface” that other agents can use to request data
or services.
The agent interface is used to structure the agents into a topology.
This topology can be strictly hierarchical as in the monolithic approach,
or it can be less strictly structured, allowing agents to exchange data and
services on a more even level.
3.3 Hierarchical network agents
A hierarchical structure consists of multiple network agents, connected
as a tree like the network nodes in the monolithic approach. Each agent
has (at most) one superior and a number of subordinate agents. Each
agent, together with its corresponding subtree of subordinate agents, be-
haves like, and possibly is, a separate EWS or network monitoring system.
This kind of recursive structuring can either be used to allow lower-level
network agents to generate and maintain an EWS-like view of their own
network or it can be used to connect existing EWS into larger structures.
Many company EWS can be connected into a national EWS and a number
of national EWS could be connected into an international EWS.
In this hierarchical structure, the agent model can solve or at least
alleviate many of the problems or requirements described in section 2.1.
Because of the individual processing and storage of sensor data, individ-
ual algorithms and visualisations can be used to monitor, analyse and
evaluate the network situation. Network operators can use their network
node to monitor their own network according to their own principles and
motivations while controlling, what gets saved and what gets transmitted
further up the tree.
If an agent does not want to directly transmit a certain part of the data
because of access restrictions or network load, it can either keep it to itself
or just advertise to the higher-level agents, that the data is available on
explicit request. An agent that needs advertised data in raw or processed
form can send a request down the tree. When the request reaches the node
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that has (at least part of) the data, it can decide whether the requested
access is permitted. If yes, the data gets passed back up the tree, possibly
after some processing.
For example, if the root agent wants to determine the number of times
that a given source IP adress was seen across the network in a given time
interval, it would send a request “give the frequency for source IP X in
time interval Y” (using some formal query language, of course) down to
each of its subordinate agents. Each receiving agent decides whether its
local authorisation settings allow that request. If yes, the event data about
the requested IP address is retrieved from storage, and the frequency is
determined. Then, the request is sent further down the tree with each
agent reacting similary. Once the answer comes back, it is combined with
the local data and sent up the tree. All answers are received by the root
agent, combined and used as planned. Of course, not only the root agent
but any agent in the tree can send such requests down its available subtree
to determine data of interest.
Transmitting queries and evaluating them in the tree is more efficient
than sending all data to the root agent and do all processing there. The
sensor network behaves like a distributed database evaluating queries on
the collective set of event data.
3.4 Network agents in non-hierarchical structures
While EWS have traditionally been structured hierarchically, this is not
a requirement for the network agent model. The hierarchical structure of
the monolithic approach mainly stems from the technical goal of easily
and quickly transmitting all data to the center for processing. “Up” was,
where the data was sent. But since a network agent can transmit its data
to any interested agent, the hierarchical structure can easily be discarded
and replaced with a model where agent connections are arbitrarily struc-
tured. Each agent can request data from other agents and offer data to
others, either as a continuous data stream of realtime event data or as
the evaluation of specific requests on stored data. Of course, the same
interface can also be used by automated analysis tools or to export data
out of an EWS as it was described in Section 2.2.
Together with agent-internal data storage and processing, a general
data access interface can be used to form many different kinds of useful
structures and service relationships, both static and dynamic. Network
agents can be connected together to form a virtual EWS (see Section 2.2)
for a designated purpose, allowing an agent to contribute its data to mul-
tiple EWS in different contexts or incorporate data from multiple special
EWS or other sensor networks in its own analyses.
The Herold project will create a software infrastructure to create and
run network agents and have them exchange information and services
for a truly cooperative approach to network monitoring. Especially non-
hierarchical interaction of network agents will hopefully provide a large
and interesting field for research experimentation and use in everyday
practical network security. Further results of the Herold project will be
published as the project continues.
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